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Abstract
This paper studies discretionary non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilization
in a New Keynesian model, where the fiscal policymaker uses a distortionary taxe as the policy
instrument and operates with long periods between optimal time-consistent adjustments of
the instrument. We demonstrate that longer fiscal cycles result in stronger complementarities
between the optimal actions of the monetary and fiscal policymakers. When the fiscal cycle is
not very long, the complementarities lead to expectation traps. However, with a sufficiently
long fiscal cycle — one year in our model — no learnable time-consistent equilibrium exists.
Constraining the fiscal policymaker in its actions may help to avoide these adverse effects.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal and monetary policies face different institutional restrictions and operate at different fre-
quencies. Monetary policymakers set interest rate every month and the decision process can
arguably be described as (constrained) optimization with the clear aim to stabilize short run
fluctuations.1 In contrast, fiscal decisions are often taken annually, and the policy of contem-
porary fiscal authorities can rarely be described as aiming to stabilize the economy in the short
run. This situation is likely to change, however, if fiscal policy is given a more active short run
stabilization role: not only the fiscal policy becomes more focussed on stabilization, but also the
decision process becomes more regular. This paper contributes to the discussion on the insti-
tutional design of stabilizing fiscal policy, which operates at a lower frequency than monetary
policy, uses distortionary taxes as a policy instrument and acts without implementation lags.
This institutional design has important implications for the dynamics of the economy. With a
longer fiscal cycle the optimal fiscal adjustments are bigger. They impact more on the monetary
policymaker and escalate the conflict between the two authorities when the fiscal policymaker
uses distortionary taxes. Indeed, optimal actions of the monetary and the fiscal policy makers are
dynamic complements in the sense of Cooper and John (1988). Higher tax rate, set by the fiscal
policymaker in response to a higher debt level, generates cost-push inflation, which increases
the marginal return to a monetary policy decision to raise the interest rate and contribute to
debt accumulation. In standard quarterly models this reinforcement mechanism is weak. We
demonstrate that it is greatly amplified if discretionary fiscal policy operates only infrequently.
We show that the gain from monetary and fiscal policy stabilization of macroeconomic fluc-
tuations can be greatly overestimated, if it is evaluated using models with frequent fiscal policy
stabilization. These models fail to account for arising expectations traps (King and Wolman,
2004) with implications of excessive volatility of welfare-relevant economic variables; these mod-
els fail to demonstrate the necessity to constrain the fiscal policymaker, as time-consistent policy
may not exist.
We study interactions of monetary and fiscal policies in the Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
class of infinite horizon non-singular discrete-time linear dynamic models that is typically used
to study aggregate fluctuations in macroeconomics. We use the standard New Keynesian model
with monopolistic competition and sticky prices to demonstrate the results. The economy is
controlled by monetary and fiscal policy makers which act non-cooperatively at different frequen-
cies. The monetary policymaker optimizes every period while the fiscal policymaker optimizes
less frequently, choosing the distortionary tax rate once every several periods. After the tax rate
is chosen, it stays at this level until the next fiscal optimization, which happens with certainty
after the given finite number of periods. The fiscal policymaker can be characterized as having
intra-period leadership. In other words, the monetary policymaker observes fiscal policy in each
period, and the fiscal policymaker knows that the monetary policymaker optimizes every period
and takes this into account when formulating policy.
More specifically, we demonstrate the existence of expectations traps in the case of longer fiscal
cycles. However, we also find that these traps are unlikely to present a problem for a policymaking
as we invoke coordination mechanisms. Following Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) we investigate
1There is an extensive literature on the subject, see e.g. King (1997), Svensson (2010).
1
stability properties of these equilibria and find that the agents are likely to coordinate on the
Pareto-preferred equilibrium in all cases that we study. More importantly, we demonstrate that
discretionary equilibria may not exist, once the fiscal cycle is sufficiently long — one year in our
model — and the reinforcement mechanism between the optimal actions of the two policymakers
becomes particularly strong. We demonstrate that these adverse effects can be mitigated if the
fiscal policymaker is constrained in its actions. We use a number of policy scenarios to illustrate
our findings which include the scenario with debt stabilization faster than socially optimal and
the scenario with constrained fiscal policymaker.
This research contributes to the literature on optimal monetary and fiscal policies in linear-
quadratic (LQ) rational expectations (RE) models, as exemplified by e.g. Leeper (1991), Dixit and
Lambertini (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997); Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2000); Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004), Linnemann (2006), Leith and von Thadden (2008) and Schabert and
von Thadden (2009). It draws on the literature on time-consistent policy with expectations traps
(King and Wolman, 2004; Blake and Kirsanova, 2012) and on coordination in RE models, see
Evans (1986), Guesnerie and Woodford (1992); Evans and Guesnerie (1993, 2003, 2005); Evans
and Honkapohja (2001), Ellison and Pearlman (2011), Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). The design
of policy which we study is similar in spirit to the limited commitment framework (Schaumburg
and Tambalotti, 2007; Debertoli and Nunes, 2010), but differs crucially by assumptions regarding
the number of policymakers, the certainty of reoptimizations and the finite number of periods
between reoptimizations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we present a model of monetary and
fiscal policy interactions. Section 3 presents the general framework with infrequent stabilization.
Section 5 discusses policy implications in three special cases: quarterly, biannual and annual fiscal
stabilization. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider the now-mainstream macro policy model, discussed in Woodford (2003), modified to
take account of the effects of fiscal policy.2 It is a closed economy model with two policymakers,
the fiscal and monetary authorities. Fiscal policy is assumed to support monetary policy in
stabilization of the economy around the non-stochastic steady state.
The economy consists of a representative infinitely-lived household, a representative firm that
produces the final good, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing firms and a monetary and
fiscal authority. The intermediate goods-producing firms act under monopolistic competition and
produce according to a production function that depends only on labor. Goods are combined
via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce aggregate output. Firms set their prices
subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity. Households choose their consumption and leisure and can
transfer income through time through their holdings of government bonds. We assume that the
fiscal authority faces a stream of exogenous public consumption. These expenditures are financed
by levying income taxes3 and by issuing one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
2See e.g. Benigno and Woodford (2003).
3We could use distortionary consumption taxes to finance the deficit. The transmission mechanism would be
the same.
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We assume that all public debt consist of riskless one-period bonds. The nominal value Bt of
end-of-period public debt then evolves according to the following law of motion:
Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + PtGt − τ tPtYt, (1)
where τ t is the share of national product Yt that is collected by the government in period t, and
government purchases Gt are treated as exogenously given and time-invariant. Pt is aggregate
price level and it is interest rate on bonds. The national income identity yields
Yt = Ct +Gt, (2)
where Ct is private consumption. For analytical convenience we introduceBt = (1+it−1)Bt−1/Pt−1
which is a measure of the real value of debt observed at the beginning of period t, so that (1)
becomes
Bt+1 = (1 + it)
(
Bt
Pt−1
Pt
− τ tYt +Gt
)
. (3)
The first-order approximation of (3) about the non-stochastic zero-inflation and zero-debt
steady state yields
bt+1 =
1
β
(
bt +
(
1−
C
Y
)
gt − τ (τ t + yt)
)
,
where bt =
Bt
Y , ct = ln
(
Ct
C
)
, τ t = ln
(
τ t
τ
)
, gt = ln
(
Gt
G
)
, yt = ln
(
Yt
Y
)
and letters without time
subscript denote steady state values of corresponding variables in zero inflation steady state. The
private sector’s discount factor β = 1/(1 + i). We have assumed B = 0 in order to make the
presentation of the model particularly simple. This assumption results in no first-order effects of
the interest rate and inflation on debt, so that the final version of the linearized debt accumulation
equation can be written as
bt+1 =
1
β
(bt + (1− τ) (1− θ) gt − τθct − ττ t) , (4)
where we used the linearized (2) to substitute out output and denoted θ = C/Y .4
The derivation of the appropriate Phillips curve that describes Calvo-type price-setting deci-
sions of monopolistically competitive firms is standard (Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Sec. A.5)
and marginal cost is a function of output and taxes. A log-linearization of the aggregate supply
relationship around the zero-inflation steady state yields the following New Keynesian Phillips
curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ
((
1
σ
+
θ
ψ
)
ct +
(1− θ)
ψ
gt +
τ
(1− τ)
τ t
)
+ ηt, (5)
where κ = (1−γβ)(1−γ)
γ
ψ
(ψ+ǫ) is the slope of Phillips curve. Parameter γ is Calvo parameter,
parameter ψ is Frisch elasticity of labour supply, σ is elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
4Because we work with one-period debt only, its proportion in the total stock of debt is not very large. We
discuss implications of this assumption for policy in Section 3.
3
parameter ǫ is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. Cost push shock ηt
follows an autoregressive process.
The social loss is defined by the quadratic loss function5
L =
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
π2t + λc
2
t
)
. (6)
while the monetary and the fiscal policymakers can have different policy objectives, LJ =
1
2E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
JQ
J (πt, ct, τ t, gt, bt) , J ∈ {M,F}. Each policymaker knows the laws of motion (4)-(5)
of the aggregate economy and takes them into account when formulating policy. The following
assumption follows Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and substantially simplifies the exposition
of the model.
Assumption 1 (policy instruments) The monetary policymaker chooses consumption ct and
then, conditional on subsequent optimal evolution of ct and πt, decides on the value of interest
rate that achieves the desired ct and πt. The fiscal policymaker uses the tax rate τ t as policy
instrument and keeps government spending constant gt = 0.
Apart from making the exposition clear, keeping fiscal spending constant allows us to focus
on the particular transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policy.
Despite the simplicity of the model, finding time-consistent optimal policy is not trivial. Of
course, the economy can be completely insulated against shocks if the two policy instruments
are adjusted to offset the effect of shocks on inflation and debt. However, such policy would be
time-inconsistent as it would need to offset the effect of expectations Etπt+1 on current inflation.
In what follows we assume that both policymakers and the private sector know that the decision
making is sequential and a different policymaker may be in the office in future periods. We refer
to this policy as policy under discretion. Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (policy) Monetary and fiscal policy mix satisfies the following assumptions.
(i) Monetary and fiscal authorities act non-cooperatively.
(ii) Both authorities are assumed to optimize sequentially under time-consistency constraint.
(iii) The monetary policymaker optimizes every period, but the fiscal policymaker optimizes
once every N periods, N ≥ 1.
(iv) The fiscal authority has intra-period leadership.
The assumption of fiscal intra-period leadership is motivated by the observation that the mon-
etary policy reaction function is much more transparent and predictable, so the fiscal policymaker
is able to take it into account when formulating policy.6 Using the interest rate as an instrument
implies that consumption and price-setting decisions are made simultaneously, while in this model
they are consecutive decisions taken by relevant agents. This makes no difference for our results.
5The criterion is derived under the assumption of steady state labour subsidy. Here parameter λ is a function of
model parameters, λ = θκ/ǫ, and ǫ is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of monopolistically produced
goods.
6Simultaneous moves of the two policy makers could be another possibility. Empirical evidence (Fragetta
and Kirsanova, 2010) suggests that in countries without fiscal decentralization, like the UK, the regime of fiscal
leadership is the most relevant.
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The assumption of time-consistency prevents the complete and instantaneous stabilization of
the economy. Moreover, the relatively large adjustments of infrequent fiscal policy may create
more difficulties for monetary policy to offset the effect of disturbances on the economy. Smooth
stabilization may not be possible any more.
The infrequency of fiscal decisions can be interpreted as fiscal commitment to the policy of
fixed tax rates in all periods between the optimization. Such policymaking, however, remains
sequential, without the ability to manipulate the expectations of the private sector beyond the
periods between fiscal reoptimizations.
Assumption 3 (policy objectives) Both policymakers are benevolent.
Different objectives of the two policymakers are likely to result in a conflict between the
policymakers as one policymaker tries to ‘undo’ the perceived harm done by the other.7 We shall
demonstrate that a similar conflict exists even if both policymakers are benevolent but operate at
different frequencies. The assumption of different frequencies also makes the leadership structure
important. If both policymakers are benevolent and face identical constraints, then the intra-
period leadership does not play any role. In our case the policymakers face different constraints,
so the leadership does matter. In this paper we have chosen to study fiscal leadership as arguably
most empirically relevant.
Finally, we make the assumption which is crucial for clear exposition without the loss of
generality.
Assumption 4 The model is perfect-foresight deterministic.
If the stochastic model is linear-quadratic then the stochastic component of the solution can
be obtained in the unique way once the deterministic component is known.8 We are interested in
issues of existence and uniqueness of the time-consistent policy and these properties are unaffected
by the introduction of stochastic components in the LQ framework.
To summarize, the law of motion of the deterministic economy can be written as:
πt = βπt+1 + κct + ντ t, (7)
bt+1 =
1
β
(bt − τθct − ττ t) , (8)
and the initial state b¯ is known to all agents, and coefficients κ = κ
(
1
σ +
θ
ψ
)
, ν = κ τ(1−τ) . Debt bt
is the only endogenous predetermined state variable. The objectives of each policymaker coincide
and are given by formula (6).
This model is highly stylized and involves relatively few parameters. Table 1 reports the
baseline calibration of parameters. Calibration of β, γ and θ is relatively straightforward, they
correspond to the most frequently estimated values of the steady state annual interest rate of
4%, the average frequency of price changes of one year, and consumption to output share of
75%. Estimation and the consequent calibration of the remaining three parameters varies across
studies.
7See e. g. Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Lambertini (2006).
8See Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996).
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameters calibration
base range
Discount factor β 0.99 —
Calvo parameter γ 0.75 —
Government share θ 0.75 —
Intertemporal elasticity σ 0.3 [0.1, 1.3]
Frisch elasticity of labour supply ψ 3.0 [0.3,4]
Elasticity of substitution between goods ǫ 11.0 [4,11]
Estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply ψ vary widely, depending on whether macro-
or micro-evidence is used. Peterman (2012) reports values of ψ ∈ [2.9, 3.1] from the empirical
work which matches volatilities of aggregate worked hours and of wages. This range is consistent
with values used by macroeconomists to calibrate general equilibrium models but greater than
the estimates of ψ ∈ [0.3, 0.8] which are obtained in microeconomic studies even if decisions on
labour participation are taken into account, see Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The
main source of this difference lies in the heterogeneity of the workforce’s reservation wages. When
a larger proportion of the workforce’s reservation wage is about the market wage, a small change
in the market wage leads to a large change in the labour force participation, see Chang and
Kim (2005) and Gourio and Noual (2009). However the density of marginal workers can only be
observed at the macro-level; the effect is larger in countries with higher involuntary unemployment
which leads to higher aggregate elasticity of labour supply. This effect is not identified at the
micro-level where a small change in the market rate often does not lead to a noticeable change in
the participation status of an individual. So we consider values between 0.3 and 4 plausible for
ψ.
Similarly, estimates of the intertemporal elasticity σ vary depending on the wealth of the
representative households and the proportion of nondurable goods in their consumption bundle,
see Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The empirical evidence for σ is
quite far-ranging from near 0.1 reported in e.g. Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), to
above 1 reported in e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) find
that the estimate of σ increases from 0.3 for the aggregate data to 0.8 for cohort data, suggesting
that the aggregation, which is implicit in the macro data, may cause a significant downward shift
in the estimate of σ.
The elasticity of substitution between goods, ǫ, determines the monopolistic mark up. Chari
et al. (2000) argue for a markup of 11% for the macroeconomy as a whole. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) obtain elasticity of substitution 7.88, corresponding to a markup of 14.5%.
Different industries have different markups, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001)
report mark ups of 27-45% for automobiles and branded cereals industries.
In all numerical exercises we use the base line values of parameters as reported in the first
column in Table 1. However, but we shall also investigate the robustness of our results to the
range of alternative calibrations given in the second column in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
3 Discretionary Equilibrium
In this Section we define discretionary equilibrium in which the monetary policymaker reoptimizes
every period while the fiscal policymaker decides once every N periods, 1 ≤ N < ∞. We refer
to the period between fiscal reoptimizations as the fiscal cycle. We denote the set of numbers p
congruent to a modulo N as [p]N . There are exactly N different sets [p]N . We shall identify these
sets with the corresponding residue: [p]N = p, so p denotes the time period after the latest fiscal
reoptimization. Both the monetary and fiscal policymakers optimize in period 0 = [0]N . Only the
monetary policymaker optimizes in periods [1]N ,..,[N − 1]N , which are labelled p = 1, .., N − 1.
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
Suppose the monetary and fiscal policymaker both optimize at period t. Because of the LQ
nature of the problem we guess and verify later that the private sector’s reaction function is a
linear function of the state:
πt+p = π
p
bbt+p, p = 0, ..,N − 1. (9)
Use (9) for p+ 1 and substitute (7) for the appropriate period to obtain:
πt+p = π
p+1
b bt+p +
(
κ − πp+1b τθ
)
ct+p +
(
ν − πp+1b τ
)
τ t+p (10)
The private sector observes policy and the state, and takes into account the ‘instantaneous’
influence of the policy choice, measured by
(
κ − πp+1b τθ
)
and
(
ν − πp+1b τ
)
.
The monetary policymaker’s problem in period p = 0, ..,N − 1 can be described by the
following Bellman equation, where the value function depends on the number of periods passed
since the last fiscal optimization. Assuming the quadratic form for the appropriate value function
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we can write the Bellman equation for the monetary policymaker in period p:
Spb2t+p = min
ct+p
((
πp+1b bt+p +
(
κ − πp+1b τθ
)
ct+p +
(
ν − πp+1b τ
)
τ t+p
)2
(11)
+λc2t+p + βS
p+1
(
1
β
(bt+p − τθct+p − ττ t+p)
)2)
,
where we substituted constraints (8) and (10) written for the appropriate period.
Minimization with respect cpt+p yields the following monetary policy reaction function:
ct+p = c
p
bbt+p + c
p
τ τ t+p (12)
where
cpb = −
(
κ − τθπp+1b
)
πp+1b −
τθ
β
Sp+1(
κ − τθπp+1b
)2
+ λ+ τ
2θ2
β S
p+1
, (13)
cpτ = −
(
κ − τθπp+1b
)(
ν − τπp+1b
)
+ τ
2θ
β S
p+1(
κ − τθπp+1b
)2
+ λ+ τ
2θ2
β S
p+1
, (14)
and p = 1, ..,N − 1. The monetary policymaker observes fiscal policy, and takes into account its
‘instantaneous’ influence, measured by cpτ .
The fiscal policymaker only optimizes in periods [0]N . Suppose the optimization happens at
time t. The Bellman equation which describes the fiscal policy decision can be written as:
V b2t = min
τ t
N−1∑
p=0
βp
(
π2t+p + λc
2
t+p
)
+ βNV b2t+N
 (15)
where constraints (8), (10), and (12) are applied in any period p = 0, ..,N − 1, because the state
in period [N ]N ≡ [0]N depends on fiscal policy in all intermediate periods, τ t+p, p = 0, ..,N − 1.
We assume that the fiscal policymaker, when chooses τ t also sets τ t+p p = 1, ..,N − 1 such
that
τ t+p = τ t. (16)
This policy has the following representation
τ t+p = τ
p
bbt+p, p = 1, ..,N − 1. (17)
Indeed, take (17) one period forward and use (16) to obtain
τ t+p+1 = τ
p+1
b bt+p+1 = τ
p+1
b
1
β
(
1− τθcpb − τ (1 + θc
p
τ ) τ
p
b
)
bt+p
= τpbbt+p
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from where
τp+1b =
βτpb
1− τθcpb − τ (1 + θc
p
τ ) τ
p
b
, p = 0, ..,N − 2.
Using recursive substitution we can write the complete set of constraints as
πt+p = Π
p,0
b bt +Π
p,0
τ τ t, ct+p = C
p,0
b bt + C
p,0
τ τ t, bt+p+1 = B
p,0
b bt + B
p,0
τ τ t
where the coefficients Πp,0b , Π
p,0
τ , C
p,0
b , C
p,0
τ , B
p,0
b and B
p,0
τ are defined by
Πp,0b =
πp+1b +
(
κ − πp+1b τθ
)
cpb
βp
p∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
)
(18)
Πp,0τ =
(
κ − πp+1b τθ
)
cpτ − τπ
p+1
b + ν − τ
(
πp+1b +
(
κ − πp+1b τθ
)
cpb
)
(19)
×
p∑
j=1
θcp−jτ + 1
βj−1
j−1∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
)
Cp,0b =
cpb
βp
p∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
)
(20)
Cp,0τ = c
p
τ − τc
p
b
p∑
j=1
θcp−jτ + 1
βj−1
j−1∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
)
(21)
Bp,0b =
1
βp+1
p∏
k=0
(
1− τθcp−kb
)
(22)
Bp,0τ = −τ
p∑
j=0
θcp−jτ + 1
βj−1
j−1∏
k=0
(
1− τθcp−kb
)
. (23)
Substitute these constraints into the Bellman equation (15) and differentiate with respect to
τ t to yield:
τ t = −
∑N−1
p=0 β
p
(
Πp,0τ Π
p,0
b + λC
p,0
τ C
p,0
b
)
+ βNBN,0τ V B
N,0
b∑N−1
p=0 β
p
((
Πp,0τ
)2
+ λ
(
Cp,0τ
)2)
+ βNV
(
BN,0τ
)2 bt (24)
From (10), (12) and (17) it follows
πpb = π
p+1
b +
(
κ − τθπp+1b
)
cpb +
((
κ − τθπp+1b
)
cpτ +
(
ν − τπp+1b
))
τpb (25)
which determines the time-consistent reaction of the private sector in (10).
The resulting transition of the economy for p = 0, .., N − 1 can be written as:
ct+p = C
p
b bt+p
πt+p = π
p
bbt+p
bt+p+1 = B
p
b bt+p
9
where
Bpb =
1
β
(
1− τθcpb − τ (θc
p
τ + 1) τ
p
b
)
Cpb = c
p
b + c
p
ττ
p
b
Substitute them into (11) and (15) to yield
Sp =
(
πpb
)2
+ λ
(
Cpb
)2
+ βSp+1
(
Bpb
)2
, p = 0, ..,N − 1 (26)
and
V =
N−1∑
p=0
βp
((
πpb
)2
+ λ
(
Cpb
)2) p∏
j=0
(
Bj−1b
)2
+ βNV
N−1∏
p=0
(
Bpb
)2
(27)
It follows that V = S0 = SN : in periods when both benevolent policymakers reoptimize their
value functions are the same.
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 2-4 the stationary discretionary equilibrium with intra-period
fiscal leadership can be described by the set of coefficients V ∪ {πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ , τ
p
b , S
p}N−1p=0 .
Proof. For a given b0 = b¯, each trajectory {bt, πt, ct, τ t}∞t=0 which solves the system of first
order conditions (8), (10), (12), and (17) we can uniquely map into the set of coefficients V ∪
{πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ , τ
p
b , S
p}N−1p=0 , satisfying (13), (14), (24), (25), (26) and (27). Conversely, if the set of
coefficients V ∪ {πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ , τ
p
b , S
p}N−1p=0 solves (13), (14), (24), (25), (26) and (27) we can uniquely
map it into the trajectory {bt, πt, ct, τ t}
∞
t=0, solving system (8), (10), (12) for given b0 = b¯.
4 Coordination Mechanisms
Discretionary policy may result in multiple policy equilibria, see Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano
(2003), King and Wolman (2004), Blake and Kirsanova (2012); in our case it implies that system
(13), (14), (24), (25), (26) and (27) may have several distinct solutions. Current policy decisions
depend on the forecast of future policy, which are made by the private sector. If there are dynamic
complementarities between actions of economic agents then multiple equilibria might arise and
coordination failures occur. Not all equilibria are empirically relevant: economic agents may
coordinate on some equilibria more likely than on others. Following Evans (1986) and drawing
on the large literature which employs learning to analyze coordination in rational expectations
(RE) models9 Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) develop and apply several iteration expectations (IE)
stability criteria for LQ RE discretionary policy models with one policymaker. In this Section
we extend these criteria to the case of two policymakers. This allows us to focus on empirically-
relevant discretionary equilibria.
Specifically, we consider learning by the private sector, the joint learning by followers, the
private sector and the monetary policymaker, the joint learning of all economic agents and learning
by the leader. We label these types of learning PS-, JF-, J- and L-learning correspondingly.
9See Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), Evans and Guesnerie (1993), Evans and Guesnerie (2003), Evans and
Guesnerie (2005), Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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4.1 Learning by Private Agents
In this section we investigate the IE-stability of RE private sector equilibria, in which the private
sector rationally responds to the given policy rules of both policymakers. The given pair of rules
represents equilibrium discretionary policy.
Discretionary equilibrium is fully characterized by the set V ∪{πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ , τ
p
b , S
p}N−1p=0 . We want
to examine whether private agents can learn their equilibrium reaction {πpb}
N−1
p=0 , given policies
which are described by V ∪ {cpb , c
p
τ , τ
p
b , S
p}N−1p=0 .
Suppose the private agents know that the policymakers implement (12) and (17) within each
fiscal cycle. They know that the fiscal policymaker changes the tax rate at periods [p]N = 0,
so that all policies and reactions have a ‘seasonality’ component. The private sector starts the
learning process and forms the expectation of the whole vector of responses within the fiscal cycle
πt+p = π¯
p
bbt+p, p = 0, ..,N − 1.
Here and below we denote the guessed values with bars. This perceived reaction of the private
sector will be consistent with a RE equilibrium if it is supported by the evolution of the economy.
The evolution of the economy (7)-(8) implies
πt+p =
(
π¯p+1b +
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
Cpb +
(
ν − τπ¯p+1b
)
τpb
)
bt+p,
where Cpb = c
p
b + c
p
ττ
p
b . Equating coefficients yields
πpb =
(
1− τ
(
τpb + θC
p
b
))
π¯p+1b + κC
p
b + ντ
p
b , p = 0, ..,N − 1. (28)
Definition 1 Equations (28) define revision mapping TPS from the initial guess of the decision
rule π¯ = {π¯pb}
N−1
p=0 to the revised decision rule π = {π
p
b}
N−1
p=0 , summarized by π = TPS (π¯) .
Definition 2 Fix-point π∗ = {πp∗b }
N−1
p=0 of the TPS− map, π = TPS (π¯) is said to be locally
IE-stable under private sector learning if
lim
k→∞
T
k
PS (π¯) = π
∗
for all π¯ in a neighborhood of π∗, π¯ = π∗.
It follows that π∗ is locally IE-stable if and only if it is a locally stable fix-point of the system
of difference equations
πk+1 = TPS (πk)
where the index k denotes the step of the updating process. A fix-point of this mapping results
in a perceived law of motion for the economy which is consistent with the economy’s actual
law-of-motion in a RE equilibrium.
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4.2 Joint Learning by Followers
Suppose that the monetary policymaker is also learning. The monetary policymaker and the
private sector take the fiscal policy decisions as given. The monetary policymaker and the private
sector jointly learn their equilibrium reactions {πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ , Sp}
N−1
p=0 , given fiscal policy which is
described by
{
V, τ0b
}
.
Recall that the fiscal policymaker chooses the policy once, at the beginning of the fiscal
cycle, and keeps the tax rate level constant until the next reoptimization. The state-dependent
representation of this policy within the fiscal cycle depends on the state, which is affected by
decisions of other agents. We assume that the private sector and the monetary policymaker treat
the intra-cycle fiscal policy parametrically, as given, but once they revise their expectations they
realize the effect of the revision on the representation of the intra-cycle fiscal reaction function,
and revise the representation. In what follows we treat τpb = τ¯
p
b , p = 2, .., N −1, but we omit this
notation to avoid writing each equation twice, once for p = 0, and once for all other periods.
The monetary policymaker and the private sector form expectations about the RE equilibrium.
The perceived reaction of the private sector should be supported by the evolution of the economy
in order to be consistent with a RE equilibrium. The evolution of the economy (7)-(8) implies
πt+p =
((
1− ττpb
)
π¯p+1b + ντ
p
b
)
bt+p +
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
ct+p, (29)
for p = 0, .., N − 1.
The perceived reaction of the monetary policymaker should also be consistent with imple-
menting the best response to the guessed reaction of the private sector:
Spb2t+p = min
ct+p
(((
π¯p+1b − π¯
p+1
b ττ
p
b + ντ
p
b
)
bt+p +
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
ct+p
)2
+λc2t+p + βS¯
p+1
(
1
β
((
1− ττpb
)
bt+p − τθct+p
))2)
,
where p = 0, .., N − 1. The revised reaction rules ct+p = C
p
b bt+p with coefficients
Cpb = −
((
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)((
1− ττpb
)
π¯p+1b + ντ
p
b
)
− S¯p+1 τθβ
(
1− ττpb
))(
(τθ)2
β
S¯p+1 +
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)2
+ λ
) = Cpb (S¯, π¯) (30)
implement the best policy response. The revised vector of value functions {Sp}N−1p=0 can be written
as
Sp =
((((
1− ττpb
)
π¯p+1b + ντ
p
b
)
+
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
Cpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2
(31)
+λ
(
Cpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2
+
1
β
S¯p+1
((
1− ττpb
)
− τθCpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2)
where
{
Cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)}N−1
p=0
are determined in (30). The revision process of the private sector described
by (29) can be written as πt+p = π
p
bbt+p, p = 0, .., N − 1, where
πpb =
((
1− ττpb
)
π¯p+1b + ντ
p
b +
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
Cpb
(
S¯, π¯
))
= πpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
. (32)
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Finally, the representation of intra-cycle fiscal policy is updated according to
τp+1b =
βτpb
1− τθCpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
− ττpb
, p = 0, .., N − 2. (33)
Definition 3 Equations (30)-(33) define the revision mapping TJF from the initial guess of the
reaction x¯ =
{
π¯, c¯, S¯
}
to the updated reaction x = {π, c, S} , x = TJF (x¯) .
Definition 4 A fix-point, x∗ = (π∗, c∗, S∗) of the TJF− map, x = TJF (x¯) is said to be locally
IE-stable under JF-learning if
lim
k→∞
T
k
JF (x¯) = x
∗
for all x¯ in a neighborhood of x∗, x¯ = x∗.
By construction, the fix-point of the revision mapping results in the law of motion of the
economy which is consistent with the RE equilibrium. As before, the fix-point of the mapping
needs to be locally stable to allow the private sector and the monetary policymaker to learn the
RE equilibrium.
4.3 Joint Learning
We now assume that all agents learning the equilibrium described by V ∪ {πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ , τ
p
b , S
p}N−1p=0 .
Both policymakers and the private sector make their guess about the RE equilibrium.
The perceived reaction of the private sector should be supported by the evolution of the
economy in order to be consistent with a RE equilibrium. The evolution of the economy (7)-(8)
implies
πt+p = π¯
p+1
b bt+p +
(
κ − π¯p+1b τθ
)
ct+p +
(
ν − π¯p+1b τ
)
τ t+p
for p = 0, .., N − 1.
The perceived reaction of the monetary policymaker should be consistent with implementing
the best response to the guessed reaction rule of the private sector:
Spb2t+p = min
ct+p
((
π¯p+1b bt+p +
(
κ − π¯p+1b τθ
)
ct+p +
(
ν − π¯p+1b τ
)
τ t+p
)2
+λc2t+p + βS¯
p+1
(
1
β
(bt+p − τθct+p − ττ t+p)
)2)
where p = 0, .., N − 1. The revised reaction rules ct+p = c
p
bbt+p + c
p
ττ t+p, p = 0, .., N − 1, with
coefficients
cpb = −
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
π¯p+1b −
τθ
β
S¯p+1(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)2
+ λ+ τ
2θ2
β S¯
p+1
= cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
(34)
cpτ = −
(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)(
ν − τπ¯p+1b
)
+ τ
2θ
β S¯
p+1(
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)2
+ λ+ τ
2θ2
β
S¯p+1
= cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
(35)
13
implement the best policy response. Consistent with the revised reactions, the intra-cycle repre-
sentation of fiscal policy τpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
satisfies
τp+1b =
βτpb
1− τθ
(
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
τpb
)
− ττpb
= τp+1b
(
S¯, π¯
)
, p = 0, .., N − 2 (36)
The perceived reaction of the fiscal policymaker should be consistent with implementing the
best response to the guessed reaction rules of the private sector and of the monetary policymaker:
V b2t = min
τ t
N−1∑
p=0
βp
(
π2t+p + λc
2
t+p
)
+ βN V¯ b2t+N

subject to constraints
πt+p = Π¯
p,0
b bt + Π¯
p,0
τ τ t, ct+p = C¯
p,0
b bt + C¯
p,0
τ τ t, bt+p+1 = B¯
p,0
b bt + B¯
p,0
τ τ t
where the functional form of Π¯, C¯ and B¯ can be determined from
Π¯p,0b =
π¯p+1b +
(
κ − π¯p+1b τθ
)
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
βp
p∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
(
S¯, π¯
))
Π¯p,0τ =
(
κ − π¯p+1b τθ
)
cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
− τπ¯p+1b + ν − τ
(
π¯p+1b +
(
κ − π¯p+1b τθ
)
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
))
×
p∑
j=1
θcp−jτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ 1
βj−1
j−1∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
(
S¯, π¯
))
C¯p,0b =
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
βp
p∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
(
S¯, π¯
))
C¯p,0τ = c
p
τ
(
S¯, π¯
)
− τcpb
(
S¯, π¯
) p∑
j=1
θcp−jτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ 1
βj−1
j−1∏
k=1
(
1− τθcp−kb
(
S¯, π¯
))
B¯p,0b =
1
βp+1
p∏
k=0
(
1− τθcp−kb
(
S¯, π¯
))
B¯p,0τ = −τ
p∑
j=0
θcp−jτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ 1
βj−1
j−1∏
k=0
(
1− τθcp−kb
(
S¯, π¯
))
with cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
and cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
determined in (34)-(35). Therefore, Π¯, C¯ and B¯ also depend on
guessed values of S¯ and π¯.
The revision of τ t can be written as τ t = τ
0
bbt with coefficients
τ0b = −
∑N−1
p=0 β
p
(
Π¯p,0τ Π¯
p,0
b + λC¯
p,0
τ C¯
p,0
b
)
+ βN B¯N,0τ V¯ B¯
N,0
b∑N−1
p=0 β
p
((
Π¯p,0τ
)2
+ λ
(
C¯p,0τ
)2)
+ βN V¯
(
B¯N,0τ
)2 = τ0b (S¯, π¯) . (37)
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Therefore, the consistent with RE equilibrium revision of the private sector reaction function
can be written as πt+p = π
p
bbt+p, p = 0, ..,N − 1, with
πpb = π¯
p+1
b +
(
κ − π¯p+1b τθ
)
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
(38)
+
((
κ − τθπ¯p+1b
)
cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+
(
ν − π¯p+1b τ
))
τpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
= πpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
Finally, consistent with RE equilibrium revision of value functions is
Sp =
(
πpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2
+ λ
(
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
τpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2
(39)
+
1
β
S¯p+1
(
1− τθcpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
− τ
(
θcpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ 1
)
τpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2
for p = 0, ..,N − 1, and
V =
N−1∑
p=0
βp
((
πpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2
+ λ
(
cpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ cpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
τpb
(
S¯, π¯
))2)
(40)
×
p∏
j=0
(
1
β
(
1− τθcj−1b
(
S¯, π¯
)
− τ
(
θcj−1τ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ 1
)
τ j−1b
(
S¯, π¯
)))2
+βN V¯
N−1∏
p=0
(
1
β
(
1− τθcpb
(
S¯, π¯
)
− τ
(
θcpτ
(
S¯, π¯
)
+ 1
)
τpb
(
S¯, π¯
)))2
.
Definition 5 Equations (34), (35), (36), (37), (38), (39), (40) define the revision mapping TJ
from the initial guess of the reaction x¯ =
{
π¯, c¯, S¯, τ¯ , V¯
}
to the updated reaction x = {π, c, S, τ , V } ,
x = TJ (x¯) .
Definition 6 A fix-point, x∗ = (π∗, c∗, S∗, τ∗, V ∗) of the TJ− map, x = TJ (x¯) is said to be
locally IE-stable under J-learning if
lim
k→∞
T
k
J (x¯) = x
∗
for all x¯ in a neighborhood of x∗, x¯ = x∗.
By construction, the fix-point of this natural revision mapping results in the law of motion of
the economy which is consistent with the RE equilibrium. The fix-point of the mapping needs to
be locally stable to allow all agents to learn the RE equilibrium jointly.
4.4 Learning by the Leader
We now assume that only the fiscal policymaker learns the RE equilibrium policy
{
τ0b , V
}
,
knowing the reaction of all agents {πpb , c
p
b , c
p
τ}
N−1
p=0 . The perceived reaction of the fiscal policymaker
should be consistent with implementing the best response to the known reaction rule of the private
sector and of the monetary policymaker:
V b2t = min
τ t
N−1∑
p=0
βp
(
π2t+p + λc
2
t+p
)
+ βN V¯ b2t+N
 (41)
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subject to constraints
πt+p = Π
p,0
b bt +Π
p,0
τ τ t, ct+p = C
p,0
b bt + C
p,0
τ τ t, bt+p+1 = B
p,0
b bt + B
p,0
τ τ t
where coefficients Π, C and B are the same as in (18)-(23).
It is straightforward to see that optimization problem (41) is equivalent to the standard
discounted LQ problem, described in e.g. Lancaster and Rodman (1995) and Kwakernaak and
Sivan (1972). The revised reaction rule τ0b
(
τ¯0b , V¯
)
in
τ t = τ
0
bbt = τ
0
b
(
τ¯0b , V¯
)
bt
and the corresponding update of the value function V = V
(
τ¯0b , V¯
)
are consistent with RE equi-
librium by construction.
The corresponding revision map τ0b = TL
(
τ¯0b
)
has at most one10 stationary fixed point which
is always locally stable, see Lancaster and Rodman (1995), see also Dennis and Kirsanova (2012)
where the same fact is proved for the LQ RE models with single policymaker.
5 Policy Interactions
In this section we study how an increase in the length of the fiscal cycle affects the economy under
discretionary policy. Dynamic complementarities play a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of
the economy once the fiscal cycle becomes longer.
We start with the known case of frequent monetary and fiscal policy stabilization.11 We use
this example to discuss the transmission mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
We continue with the case of biannual fiscal optimization, which enables us to demonstrate how
the dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of consequent monetary policymakers
within the fiscal cycle results in multiple discretionary equilibria and potential expectation traps.
We also demonstrate that the agents are likely to coordinate on the best equilibrium.
These two cases help us to investigate the more complex case of annual fiscal optimization,
which is arguably the most empirically relevant case. We demonstrate how the dynamic comple-
mentarity between the optimal actions of monetary and fiscal policymakers leads to expectation
traps. Although we demonstrate that in this case the coordination problem is likely to be resolved
as well, as all agents are more likely to coordinate on the best equilibrium, we also show that
the existence of these equilibria is very sensitive to the parameterization of the model and to
the length of fiscal cycle. We argue that actions of the fiscal policymaker should be restricted
to some extent, as this ensures the existence of good equilibrium outcome for a wide range of
parameterization of the model and policy scenarios, as well as for longer fiscal cycle.
5.1 Quarterly Fiscal Stabilization
In the standard case of frequent stabilization both policymakers operate at the same quarterly
frequency. The model is simple enough to prove the following proposition.
10Because of discounting the stationary solution may not exist.
11See Blake and Kirsanova (2011) for a general form solution to this class of problems.
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Proposition 2 If 0 < β < 1, τ > 0, λ > 0 then a stationary discretionary equilibrium exists and
unique.
Proof. The system of first order conditions (13), (14), (24), (25), (26) and (27) can be written
as follows (where we omit the index p):
cb = −
(κ − πbτθ)πb −
τθ
β V
(κ − τθπb)
2 + λ+ τ
2θ2
β V
(42)
cτ = −
(κ − πbτθ) (ν − πbτ) +
τ2θ
β V
(κ − τθπb)
2 + λ+ τ
2θ2
β V
(43)
τ b = −
((κ − τθπb) cτ + ν − τπb) (πb + (κ − τθπb) cb) + λcτcb
((κ − τθπb) cτ + ν − τπb)
2 + λc2τ +
τ2
β (1 + θcτ )
2 V
(44)
−
1
β
τ (1 + θcτ ) (1− τθcb)V
((κ − τθπb) cτ + ν − τπb)
2 + λc2τ +
τ2
β (1 + θcτ )
2 V
πb = (πb + (κ − πbτθ) cb + ((κ − πbτθ) cτ + (ν − πbτ)) τ b) (45)
V = π2b + λ (cb + cττ b)
2 +
1
β
V (1− τθcb − τ (1 + θcτ ) τ b)
2 (46)
Introduce new variable, Cb = cb + cτ τ b. Using several substitutions we transform the system
of first order conditions (42)-(46) into the system of two equations in {Cb, τ b + θCb}:
Cb (Cb, τ b + θCb) = Cb +
ν (κ − θν)
λτ (τ b + θCb) + (κ − θν)
2 (τ b + θCb) = 0 (47)
τ b (Cb, τ b + θCb) = (τ b + θCb)
2 −
λ− (κ − θν)2
λτ
(τ b + θCb)−
(1− β) (κ − θν)2
λτ2
= 0(48)
Equation (48) only depends on z = τ b + θCb and always has exactly one positive solution as the
free term is negative.
The unique positive root satisfies
1
β
|1− τ (θCb + τ b)| < 1 (49)
or equivalently 1−βτ < τ b+θCb <
1+β
τ so that the equilibrium is stationary. To see this, note that
if z+ is the positive root, then z− = −
(
(1− β) (κ − θν)2
)
/
(
λτ2z+
)
, and ∂ (z+ + z−) /∂z+ =
1 + (1− β) (κ − θν)2 /
(
λτ2z2+
)
> 0. (i) We show that τ b + θCb > (1− β) /τ . Indeed, suppose
z˜+ = (1− β) /τ. z˜+ is not the positive root to (48); if it was the positive root then the negative
root would be z˜− = − (κ − θν)
2 / (λτ) and their sum should have been equal to the negative linear
coefficient, but z˜+ + z˜− <
(
λ− (κ − θν)2
)
/ (λτ) . Moreover, any z˜+ < (1− β) /τ is not a root
of (48), because ∂ (z+ + z−) /∂z+ > 0. (ii) We show that τ b + θCb < (1 + β) /τ . Indeed, suppose
z˜+ = (1 + β) /τ. z˜+ is not the positive root to (48); if it was the positive root then the negative root
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Figure 2: Unique Equilibrium in Frequent Fiscal Optimization Model
would be z˜− = − (1− β) (κ − θν)
2 / (λτ (1 + β)) and their sum z˜++z˜− >
(
λ− (κ − θν)2
)
/ (λτ) .
Moreover, any z˜+ > (1 + β) /τ is not a root of (48), because ∂ (z+ + z−) /∂z+ > 0.
Panel I in Figure 2 presents constraints (47)-(48) in {Cb, τ b + θCb} space. Solution to equation
(48) is plotted with the dashed line, and solution to equation (47) is plotted with solid line. The
unique equilibrium is labelled A in Panel I in Figure 2 and its characteristics are given in Table
2.
Equilibrium A is IE-stable under all types of learning discussed in Section 4, and we report
this in Table 2.
It is easy to see that because equilibrium A is stationary, i.e. 1β |1− τ (τ b + θCb)| < 1, then
equation (28) implies that the fix-point of TPS is locally stable under the PS-learning.
IE-stability under the JF-learning plays an important role in the analysis of cases with longer
fiscal cycle. Using the fact that all equilibria are IE-stable under the L-learning, and replicating
the steps of the revision process of all agents who are learning, helps us to discover RE equilibria
in this and more complex cases with longer fiscal cycle. We illustrate this process in Panel II of
Figure 2. Suppose the fiscal policymaker considers implementing policy τ b, which is not necessarily
optimal. In response to this policy the followers learn their optimal response {Cb, S, πb}. Their
learning problem is equivalent to the joint learning in the single-policymaker setting, which is
discussed in details in Blake and Kirsanova (2012) and Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). If τ b = 0
then the fiscal policymaker does not respond to debt and there is unique set {Cb, S, πb}
P which
describes the case in which the monetary policymaker and the private sector coordinate on the
reaction so that in response to higher debt the monetary policymaker generates high demand and
accommodates high inflation so that debt is quickly steered back to its equilibrium level. The
corresponding positive CPb is plotted in the left chart in Panel II. If τ b > 0 and sufficiently large
then the process of debt stabilization is tightly controlled by fiscal policy and in response to higher
debt the monetary policymaker and the private sector coordinate on the response {Cb, S, πb}
A in
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Table 2: Characteristics of Equilibria
Eq. A Eq. B
Frequent Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy [τ b] [0.8671] —
Monetary Policy [Cb] [−0.0657] —
Private Sector [πb] [0.0048] —
Normalized Loss L 1.0000 —
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] —
Biannual Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy
[
τ0b ; τ
1
b
]
[0.79; 0.96] [3.57; 34.72]
Monetary Policy
[
C0b ;C
1
b
]
− [6.41; 6.87]× 10−2 [2.72; 48.36]× 10−2
Private Sector
[
π0b ;π
1
b
]
[4.7; 5.0]× 10−3 [23.8; 0.7]× 10−3
Normalized Loss L 0.9956 18.8413
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] [Y,N,N]
Annual Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy
[
τ0b ; τ
1
b ; τ
2
b ; τ
3
b
]
[0.71; 0.84; 1.04; 1.36] [1.23; 1.72; 2.87; 9.02]
Monetary Policy
[
C0b ;C
1
b ;C
2
b ;C
3
b
]
− [6.2; 7.0; 7.9; 8.3]× 10−2 − [0.10; 0.13; 0.17; 0.35]
Private Sector
[
π0b ;π
1
b ;π
2
b ;π
3
b
]
[4.6; 5.2; 5.7; 6.0]× 10−3 − [0.8; 1.0; 1.4; 2.3]× 10−2
Normalized Loss L 1.0256 2.0068
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] [Y,Y,N]
which the demand is lowered and inflation is not accommodated. The corresponding positive CAb
is plotted in the left chart in Panel II.12 If τ b is moderate, both types of responses of the monetary
policymaker and the private sector exist, as shown in the left chart in Panel II. In response to each
{Cb, S, πb}
j , j ∈ {A,P} the fiscal policymaker can learn its optimal response τ∗jb , j ∈ {A,P}.
For each set {Cb, S, πb} the response τ
∗
b is unique if it exists, see Section 4.4. Therefore, for an
initial guess τ b we find the update in the revision process of the fiscal policymaker τ
∗
b (τ b) .We plot
τ∗b = τ
∗
b (τ b) for a range of initial guesses and for each equilibrium reaction {Cb, S, πb}
j, j ∈ {A,P}
in the right chart in Panel II in Figure 2 with the solid line. By construction, all points of
intersection of this line with the 45o line are the points of discretionary equilibria which are
IE-stable under the JF-learning by construction.
The result of Proposition 2 on the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not obvious if the model
has dynamic complementarities between action of the economic agents (Cooper and John, 1988).
Optimal actions of the monetary authority and of the aggregated private sector can be dynamic
complements. Suppose the reaction of fiscal policy is given and fixed at τ∗b . For a given reaction
of the private sector πb in πt = πbbt the monetary policy finds the optimal response by solving
the corresponding Bellman equation, taking into account its intra-period leadership. If πb is
sufficiently high (low) then in response to higher-than-steady-state debt the monetary policymaker
optimally raises demand. Greater tax base leads to higher tax collection and reduces the level
12There is close resemblance between these two partial equilibria and ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy
described in Leeper (1991).
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of debt towards the steady state. Inflation starts moving back to the steady state. We plot this
U-shaped optimal reaction function Cb = Cb (πb) in the left hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3
with the solid line. In its turn, the optimal reaction of the private sector πb = πb (Cb) is increasing
in Cb. If the debt is higher than its steady state level and the monetary policymaker generates
higher demand, the total effect of the higher demand on marginal costs is always positive, as the
tax rate is fixed to τ∗b . We plot the positively sloped reaction function πb = πb (Cb) in the left
hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3 with the dashed line. Both lines are positively sloped in
the area with relatively large πb, and this can result in multiplicity of partial equilibria, i.e. in
multiplicity of optimal responses of the monetary authorities and the private sector. Indeed, if
we reduce (e.g. halve) the fiscal feedback τ b then there are three points of intersection of optimal
reactions of monetary authorities and the private sector, see the right hand side chart. The case
in the left hand side chart in Panel I corresponds to multiple discretionary equilibria discussed in
Blake and Kirsanova (2012) where the fiscal feedback on debt of non-strategic fiscal policy was
relatively small to guarantee multiplicity of equilibria.
Optimal actions of fiscal policy and the private sector can be dynamic complements too.
Fixing the monetary policy reaction to the optimal level C∗b < 0 produces reactions of the fiscal
authority τ b = τ b (πb) and of the private sector πb = πb (τ b) plotted in Panel II in Figure 3. The
reaction of the private sector is positively sloped as higher tax rate set by the fiscal authority in
response to higher debt τ b always results in higher prices set by firms. The reaction curve if the
fiscal policymaker is also positively sloped but only for moderately positive response of inflation
to debt, πb. To understand this suppose the debt is higher than its steady state level. Because
C∗b < 0 the demand is automatically reduced and so are marginal costs. Lower demand also
contributes to faster debt accumulation. If the response of inflation to debt is only moderately
positive, then the optimal response of taxes to debt rises with stronger response of inflation. This
will keep debt under control, and will not compromise inflation stabilization. As a result, the
reaction curves of the private sector and the fiscal policymaker are both positively sloped, but
only in a relatively narrow area of responses of the private sector. For our baseline calibration,
and given C∗b , there are three jointly optimal discretionary responses of fiscal policymaker and
the private sector. However, only one of them results in discretionary equilibrium in the model,
as the other two partial equilibria require different optimal policy response once the monetary
policy becomes strategic.
Finally, and most importantly for our study, optimal actions of the monetary and the fiscal
policymakers can also be dynamic complements. Higher tax rate, set by the fiscal policymaker
in response to a high debt level, τ b , generates greater cost-push inflation, which increases the
marginal return to a monetary policy decision to reduce demand and contribute to the debt
accumulation. The monetary policy reaction function Cb = Cb (τ b) is negatively sloped, see Panel
III in Figure 3. Conversely, a reduction in response of demand to debt, Cb, makes it optimal
to raise taxes in order to prevent too fast accumulation of debt. As a result, the fiscal policy
reaction function τ b = τ b (Cb) is also negatively sloped in wide area, see Panel III in Figure 3.
The presence of dynamic complementarities is a necessary condition for the multiplicity of
discretionary equilibria, see King and Wolman (2004) and Blake and Kirsanova (2012). However
this condition is not sufficient and, as we argue next, the interaction of the two mechanisms in
the model with frequent fiscal optimization results in the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
20
−0.2 −0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
pib
C b
Panel I: Fiscal policy reaction is given
 
 
monetary policy
private sector
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
τb
C b
Panel II: Private sector reaction is given
 
 
monetary policy
fiscal policy
−0.04 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
pib
τ b
Panel II: Monetary policy reaction is given
 
 
private sector
fiscal policy
−0.2 −0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
pib
C b
τb = 0.5τb
*
 
 
monetary policy
private sector
τb = τb
*
A A
B
C
Cb = Cb
* pib = pib
*
A
B
C
A
Figure 3: Dynamic complementarities between agents’ actions
First, the complementarity between optimal decisions of the private sector and of the monetary
policymaker may result in multiplicity only if fiscal policy optimally responds to debt only weakly,
see Panel I, the right hand chart. The optimal fiscal response τ∗b even to the weak initial guess
τ b is strong enough to rule out the equilibrium with passive monetary policy.
Second, although the optimal decision of the fiscal policymaker is increasing in the optimal
decision of the monetary policymaker, this dynamic complementarity between optimal decisions
of the two policymakers in case of frequent fiscal optimization is not strong enough to create the
multiplicity.
The following two cases demonstrate how the longer fiscal cycle increases the strength of
dynamic complementarities in the model and how this shapes the optimal outcome of monetary
and fiscal policy interactions.
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5.2 Biannual Fiscal Stabilization
Suppose that both policymakers optimize in even periods, and we index all such periods with
index 0. Only the monetary policymaker optimizes in odd periods, we index such periods with
index 1. To save on notation we use the period index p ∈ {0, 1} and use −p to indicate odd
periods if p = 0, and even periods if p = 1.
Despite we cannot prove analytically the existence and multiplicity of equilibria, we can find
all discretionary equilibria numerically.
Proposition 3 For the base line calibration of the model two discretionary equilibria exist.
Proof. The first order conditions derived in Section 3 can be written as
τ0b = −
Π0τΠ
0
b + λc
0
τ c
0
b + βΠ
1,0
τ Π
1,0
b + βλC
1,0
τ C
1,0
b + β
2B2,0τ B
2,0
b V
(Π0τ )
2 + λ (c0τ )
2 + β
(
Π1,0τ
)2
+ βλ
(
C1,0τ
)2
+ β2V
(
B2,0τ
)2 (50)
τ1b =
βτ0b
1− τ
(
(1 + θc0τ ) τ
0
b + θc
0
b
) (51)
cpb = −
(
κ − τθπ−pb
)
π−pb −
τθ
β S−p(
κ − τθπ−pb
)2
+ λ+ τ
2θ2
β
S−p
(52)
cpτ = −
(
κ − τθπ−pb
)(
ν − τπ−pb
)
+ τ
2θ
β
S−p(
κ − τθπ−pb
)2
+ λ+ τ
2θ2
β S−p
(53)
S0 = V (54)
S1 =
(
π1b
)2
+ λ
(
C1b
)2
+ βS0
(
B1b
)2
(55)
V =
(
π0b
)2
+ λ
(
C0b
)2
+ β
((
π1b
)2
+ λ
(
C1b
)2)(
B0b
)2
+ β2V
(
B0b
)2 (
B1b
)2
(56)
After multiple substitutions the system of first order conditions (50)-(56) can be reduced to
the polynomial system of two equations C0b
(
C0b , τ
0
b
)
= 0 and τ0b
(
C0b , τ
0
b
)
= 0, although at the
expense of much complexity. We plot solutions to these equations in Panel I in Figure 4. The
curves intersect in two points with V = S0 > 0, S1 > 0, and
∣∣B0bB1b ∣∣ < 1.We label these points of
intersection as equilibria A and B.
Multiplicity of discretionary equilibria implies that following a disturbance, for example a
higher initial debt level, the economy can follow one of multiple paths, each of which satisfies
conditions of optimality and time-consistency. Each of these paths is associated with different
monetary and fiscal policies; see Figure 5 which plots two different adjustment paths following
the same initial increase in the debt level. For comparison, the Figure also includes responses in
case of frequent fiscal stabilization.
Suppose the level of debt is above the steady state and fiscal policy raises the tax rate for two
periods. Following the high marginal cost inflation will rise and stay above the steady state for
these two periods. The monetary policymaker will find it optimal to intervene. The monetary
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Figure 4: Discretionary Equilibria in the Biannual Fiscal Stabilization Model
policymaker at time 0 takes into account monetary policy in period 1. There is a dynamic
complementarity between the actions of the two consequent monetary policymakers within the
fiscal cycle: the deeper is the future cut in demand, the bigger payoff the current monetary
policymaker gets from engineering high demand today. A high demand today results in optimal
reduction of demand in the future, within the same fiscal cycle. Two point-in-time equilibria arise.
In the first such equilibrium, the period-0 monetary policymaker will keep the current demand
low and the period-1 monetary policymaker does not generate a big cut in demand. In the
second equilibrium, the period-0 monetary policymaker stimulates high demand in anticipation
that the period-1 monetary policymaker will implement a cut in demand. The fiscal policymaker
when choosing policy in period 0, perceives the both possibilities. The optimal fiscal response
in the first point-in-time equilibrium response is to raise the tax rate less than in the second
equilibrium. The strong response of the tax rate in the second equilibrium generates a ‘zig-zag’
pattern of adjustment: with low two-period-average demand, the increase in the tax rate generates
substantial fall in the stock of debt so that the second half year cycle ‘mirrors’ the first half year
one, but with the opposite sign. Figure 5 also demonstrates that in equilibrium A the paths
of all variables ‘approximate’ the optimal paths of the corresponding variables under frequent
optimization, and we shall call equilibrium A ‘approximating’. We call equilibrium B ‘zig-zag’.
Despite the clearly increased inflation volatility, the loss in the approximating equilibrium is
slightly lower than it is in the unique equilibrium under frequent optimization, see Table 2. This
is mainly due to faster stabilization of the economy in this equilibrium. The two-period tax rate
increase predominantly determines the two-period speed of debt adjustment
∣∣B0bB1b ∣∣A = 0.64 <
0.96 = |Bb|
2 . This welfare gain of faster stabilization is slightly higher than the welfare loss of
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higher volatility. The loss in the ‘zig-zag’ equilibrium is much higher than in the ‘approximating’
equilibrium. Not only it generates the relatively slow speed of adjustment, as
∣∣B0bB1b ∣∣B = 0.79 >∣∣B0bB1b ∣∣A , but it also induces very high volatility of economic valuables.
Finally, equilibrium A is IE-stable under all types of learning we consider in this paper.
Equilibrium B is not IE-stable under both JF-and J-learning. Panel II in Figure 4 illustrates
this.
To summarize, the main conclusion from the example of biannual fiscal stabilization is the
demonstration of the existence of the approximating equilibrium. Although the other equilibrium
exists, the approximating equilibrium delivers the best possible outcome under the infrequent
discretionary fiscal stabilization, and is also the only equilibrium which is IE-stable under all
types of learning we study in this paper. In this equilibrium the monetary policymaker can offset
most adverse effects of fiscal infrequency on welfare-related macroeconomic variables. In the next
example we argue that we should not take this result for granted once the fiscal cycle becomes
longer.
5.3 Annual Fiscal Stabilization
5.3.1 Multiplicity of Discretionary Policy Equilibria
Building on results in the previous section we present the third example of infrequent fiscal stabi-
lization. Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant setup in which the monetary policymaker
reoptimizes every quarter, but the fiscal policymaker reoptimizes only at the beginning of every
four quarters.
In this model we are unable to present the system of first order conditions as a system of two
polynomial equations and use the graphical method of finding solutions. We have to resort to
numerical methods and the stability properties to find discretionary equilibria of interest.
Proposition 4 If the monetary policymaker takes decisions quarterly and the fiscal policymaker
optimizes annually then for the base line calibration of the model there are two discretionary
equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning.
Proof. The proof relies on the use of numerical methods. As discussed in Section 5.1 we search for
equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning by replicating the steps of the revision process
of all agents who are learning. For every, not necessarily optimal τ0b we find all lim
k→∞
T
k
JF (x¯) = x
∗
where x¯ is an initial guess of x = (π, c, S) , as explained in Section 4.2.13 For every x∗ we find
τ0∗b = lim
k→∞
T
k
L
(
τ¯0b
)
for the initial guess τ¯0b . We, therefore obtain the mapping τ
0∗
b = τ
0∗
b
(
τ0b
)
which is plotted in Panel I in Figure 6 with the solid line. The curve τ0∗b = τ
0∗
b
(
τ0b
)
intersects
the 45o line in two points, labelled A and B. By construction, these points are the points of
discretionary equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning. With further increase in τ0b
no further equilibria were discovered.14
13The limit is computed numerically with tolerance |xk+1 − xk| < 10
−13.
14 In the area of discontinuity in Panel I the time-consistent representation of the fixed tax rate policy requires
infinitely large feedback on debt in the last quarter τ3b . No discretionary equilibria exist there.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses and counterfactual simulations. Fiscal policy optimizes every other
period.
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Figure 6: Discretionary Equilibria
The dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of the two policymakers is re-
sponsible for the multiplicity of equilibria. An optimal response of monetary policy reinforces the
action of fiscal policy: higher levels of taxation have a cost-push effect and so the optimal mone-
tary response is to reduce demand and the tax base. Smaller tax base requires a higher tax rate
to ensure the desired speed of debt stabilization. Both policymakers can coordinate on either slow
or fast correction of the level of debt towards the target. Figure 7 illustrates these interactions.
Consider equilibrium A. Suppose the initial debt is higher than in the steady state and the tax
rate is kept high for four periods. This implies a steep reduction in debt. The effect of future high
tax rates and high marginal cost creates expectations of high future inflation. If monetary policy
does not offset the effect of fiscal ‘infrequency’ then debt and consumption adjust in a linear way
between the periods of fiscal optimization. The effect of lower consumption is smaller than the
effect of higher tax rate and inflation stays above the frequent optimization solution benchmark.
The tax rate remains high for the four periods and, by the end of the fourth period, it is much
higher than it would be if optimization happened every period. The tax correction in the fifth
period brings inflation down. Figure 7 demonstrates that the ability of the optimal monetary pol-
icy to reduce inflation volatility is limited. Indeed, it is clear from the picture that consumption
should go down first and then up in the first four periods if the inflation humps in first two periods
to be eliminated. Such stabilization results in sub-optimally high volatility of consumption. In
what follows we call equilibrium A ‘slow approximating’. This equilibrium is IE-stable under all
types of learning we consider in this paper, limn→∞ Tnj
(
τ0b
)
= τ0Ab , j ∈ {PS, JF, J}
Under discretionary equilibriumB the tax rate is initially kept above the frequent-optimization
benchmark. This generates a much steeper reduction of the level of debt than is observed in the
slow approximating equilibrium A. The higher tax rate results in a higher level of inflation and
lower consumption. We call equilibrium B ‘fast approximating’. This equilibrium is not IE-
stable under the J-learning but is stable under the private sector learning and the JF-learning.
The IE-stability under the JF-learning allowed us to locate it, see Figure 6.
To summarize, in case of the annual fiscal cycle there are at least two discretionary policy
equilibria. Only two equilibria are IE-stable under the JF-learning. Their existence is a result of
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Figure 7: Impulse responses and counterfactual simulations. Fiscal policy optimizes once a year.
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the strong dynamic complementarity between optimal actions under the two policies, monetary
and fiscal, given that fiscal policy uses distortionary taxes as the policy instrument. However,
their existence is likely to be non-robust to the model specification; this is suggested by Panel I
in Figure 6. Indeed, equilibria A and B are located on the same curve τ0∗b
(
τ0b
)
, which may not
intersect the 45o line at all. In the next section we discuss why this may occur.
5.3.2 Existence of Approximating Policy Equilibrium
We argue that the existence of the approximating equilibrium is not robust to changes in model
calibration and to policy scenarios. To communicate the argument we present several examples.
Fast Stabilization of Debt Consider a policy scenario in which the fiscal policymaker is
assigned an additional target to stabilize debt faster than socially optimal, such as the new Eu-
ropean Fiscal Treaty. Suppose the monetary policymaker is benevolent, but the fiscal authority’s
objective function is modified to include a debt target
LF =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
π2t + λc
2
t + µbb
2
t
)
.
If the fiscal policymaker is benevolent, as studied above, then µb = 0.
The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends on the calibration of µ. Both approx-
imating equilibria do not exist if µb > 0 and is sufficiently high.
15 In order to understand this
result, consider the familiar scenario of high initial debt. Suppose that both policymakers are
benevolent and we are in the slow approximating equilibrium A, see the left panel in Figure 7. If
we impose a debt target for fiscal policy, i.e. start increasing µb ≥ 0, the fiscal policymaker will
try to speed up the debt stabilization with an increase in the tax rate relative to the benchmark
case of µb = 0. The cost-push effect will increase inflation more and so the monetary policymaker
will choose to engineer a bigger fall in consumption. This, of course, will slow down the speed of
debt stabilization and require an even higher tax rate. The process converges: each additional
reduction in demand requires a smaller increase in the tax rate. Equilibrium exists, and in this
equilibrium the debt is reduced faster than is plotted in the left panel in Figure 7.
This contrasts with the effect of introducing the debt target in equilibrium B. Suppose debt
is higher than in the steady state by one unit, policymakers are benevolent and we are in the fast
approximating equilibrium B, see the right panel in Figure 7. Note that in this equilibrium debt is
stabilized with an observed overshooting after the first year. If we impose a debt target, i.e. start
increasing µb ≥ 0, then raising the tax rate in the first several periods becomes counterproductive.
If the tax rate is raised higher than in the µb = 0 case, this results in even bigger overshooting of
debt, which works towards destabilizing the debt. In order to ensure faster debt convergence the
tax rate has to rise less and monetary policy has to engineer a smaller fall in consumption. The
fiscal policymaker anticipates that demand will not respond much and will lower the tax rate.
This process converges: each additional reduction in the size of demand cut requires a smaller
reduction in the size of the tax rate increase.
15For the benchmark calibration of model parameters this threshold value of µ = 0.0003.
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Figure 8: The Limiting Case of the Unique Approximating Equilibrium in the Annual Fiscal
Optimization Model
To summarize, with the increasing weight on the debt target equilibria A and B move towards
each other so that the dynamics of the economy in equilibria A and B become similar. The
dynamic of the economy in response to the higher debt level in the limiting case A = B is plotted
in Figure 8. For comparison we also plot the result of frequent stabilization without the debt
target.
If the debt target becomes even stronger, then no approximating equilibrium exists. Any
proposed increase of the tax rate τ0b results in a strong optimal IE-stable under the JF-learning
response of the other agents within the fiscal cycle. To counteract the perceived response requires
the bigger initial rise τ0∗b = τ
0∗
b
(
τ0b
)
> τ0b . We can summarize this outcome in the form of the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 For the base line calibration of the model and with sufficiently high weight on the
debt target of fiscal authorities the approximating discretionary equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. The proof is numerical. Our iterative approach finds two equilibria under the base line
calibration with µb = 0. With an increase in parameter µb the two equilibria eventually coincide
and disappear as τ0∗b = τ
0∗
b
(
τ0b
)
does not intersect the 45o degree line.
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This result does not imply that there is no discretionary equilibrium if equilibria A and B
do not exist. Yet another equilibrium might exist. In particular, Panel II in Figure 6 and its
similarity with Panel II in Figure 4 suggests that ‘zig-zag’ equilibrium might exist.16 Strategic
complementarity between the actions of subsequent monetary policymakers may lead to a zig-zag
adjustment of demand within the fiscal cycle. These adjustments might be ‘fine tuned’ such that
the annual average magnitude of them is not large enough to provoke the destabilizing increase in
the tax rate. However, such equilibrium is not IE-stable under the JF- and J-learning. Moreover,
it is difficult to call such equilibrium ‘approximating’.
The existing algorithms for finding solutions are not suited to obtaining all possible equilibria
in a complex case with many states. We could only do this for the quarterly and the biannual
models. However, Figure 6 makes it clear that the approximating equilibrium will disappear if the
debt target is sufficiently strong, rather than we suddenly became unable to locate it numerically.
We can be reasonably sure that if an additional equilibrium exists in the annual optimization
model, this equilibrium will not be IE-stable under the JF- and J-learning, it will also generate
a very low level of social welfare because of the high volatility in macroeconomic variables.
Calibration of the Model The existence of the approximating equilibrium is also sensitive
to the calibration of the model. Calibrations of the model which result in stronger reactions of
monetary and fiscal policies are likely to lead to non-existence of the approximating equilibrium.
Both approximating equilibria do not exist if the Frisch elasticity labour supply ψ is reduced
to 2.3, or if the baseline value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ is only slightly
increased to 0.35, or if the elasticity of substitution between goods ǫ is reduced to 5.7 which
corresponds to an increase of the mark up to 21%.
All these threshold values of parameters are completely plausible and are within the range of
estimates which are often obtained in empirical studies of aggregated data, as we argue in Section
2.
High Level of Debt The main case discussed in Section 2 assumes zero level of the steady
state debt. This assumption reflects the relatively small proportion of the short-term debt in a
typical developed economy, and allows us to present many results in an analytical way. However,
high and persistent level of debt is not uncommon.
We can rewrite our model in the more general form, using interest rate as the monetary
policy instrument, and retaining the possibility to study implications of higher level of steady
state debt. We can demonstrate that the size of the steady state level of debt affects the strength
of the dynamic complementarity. The effect of the nominal interest rate and inflation on the
process of debt accumulation rises linearly with the steady state level of debt. In response to
high inflation the optimal monetary policy will raise interest rate; both the high (real) interest
rate and the consequently low tax base increase the rate of debt accumulation, and this effect is
stronger with higher steady state level of debt.
The numerical analysis of this scenario produces diagrams that are remarkably similar to the
case of the debt target. If the steady state debt to output ratio reaches approximately 0.25 — which
16We cannot use the ‘continuity’ argument as the reaction function of an agent is described by a rational function,
not by a polynomial function.
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corresponds to short-term debt to annual output ratio of 0.07 — then discretionary equilibria A
and B coincide. With higher debt to output ratio the approximating equilibrium does not exist.
Frequency of Fiscal Optimization The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends
on the frequency of fiscal optimization. The longer the period between the reoptimizations the
longer the tax rate remains fixed, and the stronger action of monetary policy is required in order
to offset the adverse effect on inflation when the tax is adjusted. The approximating discretionary
equilibrium may not exist.
Constraining the Fiscal Policymaker In order to preserve the approximating equilibrium
the strength of the complementarity should be reduced. One way to achieve this is to constrain
the fiscal policymaker by imposing penalty µτ on the excessive movement of fiscal instrument
LF =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
π2t + λc
2
t + µττ
2
t
)
.
If µτ is not too large then this policy results in the unique IE-stable under the JF-learning
equilibrium. However, if µτ is sufficiently large then the complementarity between the monetary
policymaker and the private sector’s actions leads to multiplicity, very similar to the result in
Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). Panel III in Figure 6 demonstrates the outcome when µτ = 0.1.
There are two stationary equilibria, both of which are IE-stable under all types of learning which
we consider. If fiscal policy does not react to debt sufficiently strongly — in this case because
it is constrained — then the agents can either coordinate on equilibrium A in which the private
sector does not expect the monetary policymaker reacts to debt but stabilized inflation and the
monetary policymaker validates these expectations, or they can coordinate on equilibrium B in
which the private sector expects the monetary policymaker accommodates inflationary shocks
but ensures fast stabilization of domestic debt and the monetary policymaker validates these
expectations.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the implications of infrequent discretionary fiscal optimization for the sta-
bilization of the economy, assuming dynamic interactions of monetary and fiscal policymakers
where both policymakers are benevolent and the fiscal policymaker uses distortionary taxes to
stabilize the economy. We demonstrate the presence of dynamic complementarity between the
optimal monetary and fiscal policies. A higher tax rate, which is required to stabilize higher
debt, will have a cost-push effect. The optimal monetary policy response to this will generate a
reduction in demand and in the tax base, and faster debt accumulation. Anticipating this, the
fiscal authorities will wish to raise tax rates further.
If both policies operate with the same frequency, this reinforcement mechanism is weak and
does not lead to adverse effects. However, with longer fiscal cycle, the effect of this mechanism
is greatly amplified. If the length of fiscal cycle is not too long then expectation traps arise.
With more periods between fiscal reoptimizations and with stronger reinforcement mechanism an
(IE-stable) discretionary equilibrium may not exist.
31
We demonstrate the latter outcome for many practical scenarios. We argue, therefore, that
the fiscal policymaker who reoptimizes only infrequently should be constrained. A moderate
penalty on variability of the fiscal instrument can be sufficient to reduce the degree of dynamic
complementarity between the actions of the two policymakers.
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